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ON THE ROAD AGAIN: THE D.C. CIRCUIT
REINVIGORATES THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES
V. DELOITTE & TOUCHE
Christopher R. Wray*
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
sitting en banc, found that tax accrual workpapers prepared by in-
house tax attorneys did not constitute work product.' The decision
was widely panned. One prominent law firm described the Textron
decision as "merrily roll[ing] over established notions of work-prod-
uct,"2 while a representative for the Association of Corporate Coun-
sel-an organization for in-house attorneys-described the case as
"eviscerat[ing] the work-product doctrine."3
Only months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit revived the work-product doctrine and
found that audit workpapers can receive protection.4 Unlike Textron,
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2013; Bachelor of
Science in Business Administration, Accounting and Finance, Washington University
in St. Louis, 2006. I am grateful to Professors Matthew J. Barrett and John H.
Robinson, Notre Dame Law School, for their invaluable insight and advice in the
research and writing of this Note. I also thank Mr. Kyle Ubl for his thoughts and the
editors and staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their assistance and support.
1 See generally United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding
that tax accrual workpapers used in a financial statement audit did not qualify for
work-product protection).
2 Edward L. Froelich & Hollis L. Hyans, United States v. Deloitte LLP: Work Prod-
uct Redeemed, Textron Rebuffed, Client Alert (Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco,
CA.),July 29, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.nofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/10
0729WorkProduct.pdf.
3 Amir Efrati, Ruling in Tax-Auditing Case Puts Corporations on Edge, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 20, 2009, at A9.
4 See generally United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that tax accrual workpapers used in a financial statement audit could qualify for
work-product protection).
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the United States v. Deloitte LLP decision was well reasoned and well
received: one prominent law firm described the decision as
"redeem[ing]" the work-product doctrine and "rebuff[ing]" Textron.5
Public companies-particularly their general counsels-breathed a
sigh of relief.
The Deloitte decision contributes to work-product case law in
three respects: (1) it is the first federal circuit court decision on the
work-product doctrine as applied to audit workpapers following the
First Circuit's much maligned Textron decision; (2) it is the first fed-
eral appellate court decision to comment on the waiver of work prod-
uct in the context of financial statement audits; and (3) it affects the
rules of evidence in the United States Tax Court.
This Note will analyze the current status of the work-product doc-
trine and review positively Deloitte's impact on the law, arguing that
the opinion, unlike Textron, provides a sound legal framework rooted
in statute and longstanding case law.
Part I of this Note provides a foundational background of the
work-product doctrine as applied to audit workpapers. Part II ana-
lyzes the Deloitte decision's effect on what constitutes work product,
and Part III discusses the decision's effect on work-product waiver.
Finally, in Part IV, this Note analyzes the policy and legal arguments
for and against the discoverability of audit workpapers and positively
critiques the Deloitte decision.
I. THE WINDING RoAD FROM HicKMAN TO TExTRoiN' THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND TAx ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS
A. The Journey Begins: Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3)
The Supreme Court established the work-product doctrine in
1947 in Hickman v. Taylor.6 In Hickman, the Court held that an attor-
ney's notes taken during interviews with witnesses in anticipation of
litigation are not discoverable.7 To prepare for litigation, the Court
said, our system must enable an attorney to "sift what he considers to
be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference."8
5 Froelich & Hyans, supra note 2, at 1.
6 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
7 Id. at 514. A single document may contain both discoverable work product
(such as a witness statement) and nondiscoverable work product (such as a conclu-
sion of counsel that the witness seems trustworthy and would be good to use at trial).
In this case, courts will generally order production with the nondiscoverable material
redacted. See RCHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.3 (2d ed. 2009).
8 Id. at 511.
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Such "work is reflected ... in interviews, statements, memoranda, cor-
respondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and count-
less other tangible and intangible ways" that are undiscoverable.9 The
work-product doctrine, as envisioned in Hickman, precludes opposing
counsel from gaining access to an attorney's thoughts, trial strategies,
and legal theories.
The Supreme Court based its decision primarily on public policy
concerns. Asserting that lawyers would be less likely to put their
thoughts in writing if they were discoverable, the Court said the
"effect on the legal profession [of permitting discovery] would be
demoralizing" and the "interests of the clients and the cause ofjustice
would be poorly served."10 Work-product protection would
encourage robust legal analysis by disallowing parties from litigating
"on wits borrowed from the adversary.""
The Hickman decision became partially codified by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3), which provides that "a party may not dis-
cover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative"
unless a substantial need can be shown.' 2 The Advisory Committee's
notes reflected the public policy sentiments of the Court in Hickman:
"[E] ach side's informal evaluation of its case should be protected ...
each side should be encouraged to prepare independently, and ...
one side should not automatically have the benefit of the detailed pre-
paratory work of the other side."' 3
As the Deloitte majority would later point out, Hickman was only
partially codified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3).14 The
Rule does not contain an exhaustive list of what is work product, and
any document containing the "mental impressions" of an attorney-as
well as intangible items-can qualify for work-product protection.15
B. A Necessary Detour: Audit Workpapers and Tax Accruals
All public companies in the United States are required to provide
an annual financial report to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
9 Id.
10 See id.
11 Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). Protection does not apply to "materials assembled in
the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to liti-
gation, or for other nonlitigation purposes." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) advisory com-
mittee's note (1970 amendment).
13 Id.
14 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
15 Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
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sion (SEC).16 The report must include financial statements prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
and the financial statements must be audited by an independent pub-
lic accountant under generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). 17
GAAP is promulgated exclusively by the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (FASB), and GAAS is established chiefly by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).18 Under GAAS, an
auditor must state in the audit report "whether the financial state-
ments are presented in accordance with [GAAP]."19 Material depar-
tures from GAAP require either a qualified or an adverse opinion in
the auditor's report.20
GAAS also mandates that the auditor prepare and maintain
"audit documentation in connection with each engagement in suffi-
cient detail to provide a clear understanding of the work per-
formed[,] . .. the audit evidence obtained and its source, and the
conclusions reached."21 The documentation "[p]rovides the princi-
pal support for the opinion expressed regarding the financial infor-
mation or the assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2) (2006) (permitting the Securities and Exchange
Commission to require audited annual reports); see also 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2005)
(requiring that Form 10-K be used to file annual reports with the SEC).
17 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02 (2005) (defining an audit to be an "examination of the
financial statements by an independent accountant in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards").
18 DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETr, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERs 150
(Concise 4th ed. 2006) ("To date ... the SEC has only occasionally established audit-
ing standards, so it has been mostly the accounting profession, through the AICPA's
Auditing Standards Board, which has determined 'generally accepted auditing stan-
dards' or 'GAAS."'). The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has
the ability to "establish or adopt . .. auditing, quality control, ethics, independence,
and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for" public compa-
nies. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(2) (2006). However, to date, the PCAOB has issued only
fifteen such auditing standards, and they have adopted many of the AICPA's stan-
dards as interim standards. See Auditing, PuBLIc COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT
BOARD, http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 22, 2012).
19 See CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Adherence to Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles § 410[.01] (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2011).
20 See CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Lack of Conformity
With Generally Accepted Accounting Principles § 544 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2011); see also HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 18, at 175-78 (discussing
the difference between a qualified, unqualified, and adverse opinion).
21 CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Audit Documentation
§ 339.03 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2011) (parenthetical omitted).
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expressed."22 Audit documentation is commonly known as
workpapers or working papers.23
GAAP has long required public companies to "accrue" a
"reserve" 24 for contingent tax liabilities, now usually referred to as
uncertain tax positions (UTPs). 25 Contingent tax liabilities include
estimates of potential losses if certain tax positions are not sustained.2 6
While various documents are used to analyze tax accruals, a common
format was spotlighted in the Textron dispute: a spreadsheet listing
"each debatable item, including in each instance the dollar amount
subject to possible dispute and a percentage estimate of the IRS's
chances of success. Multiplying the amount by the percentage fixes
the reserve entered on the books for that item."27 These documents
are routinely given to independent auditors to provide support for the
contingent tax liabilities and UTPs, and auditors are required to keep
such documents in the workpapers to support their opinion.
Thus, "tax accrual work papers provide a resource for the IRS, if
the [government] can get access to them."28 These workpapers
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards
No. 5 1 61 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas5.pdf ("Accounting accruals are simply a method of allocating costs among
accounting periods and have no effect on an enterprise's cash flow.") (now super-
seded by and codified in various sections of the FASB Accounting Standards Codifica-
tion). A "reserve" for purposes of this Note is the liability associated with an accrued
expense and does not indicate that any cash or other assets have been set aside for a
particular purpose. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 18, at 420-23 (discussing the
various uses of the term "reserve" in financial accounting).
25 See HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 18, at 455.
26 United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2009).
27 Id. at 23.
28 Id. Starting with tax year 2010, certain companies are required to file the
newly released Schedule UTP with their tax return. The IRS designed the schedule to
gather a description of each uncertain tax position for which the company has
booked a reserve in their financial statements, although specific amounts of each
reserve need not be disclosed. The stated goals of the schedule include a reduction
in "the time it takes to find issues and complete an audit." Douglas H. Shulman,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Remarks Before the Tax Executives Institute 60th
Mid-Year Meeting (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=221280,00.html. The IRS, however, has updated and expanded the "policy of
restraint" with the implementation of Schedule UTP. Under the policy of restraint,
the IRS will not, during an examination, assert waiver of the work-product doctrine
for any document given to an independent auditor as part of an audit of the tax-
payer's financial statements. Additionally, a taxpayer may redact from tax workpapers
any "working drafts, revisions, or comments concerning the concise description of tax
positions reported on Schedule UTP" as well as "the amount of any reserve related to
20121 1801
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"pinpoint the 'soft spots' on a corporation's tax return by highlighting
those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position that
may, at some later date, require the payment of additional taxes" and
by providing "an item-by-item analysis of the corporation's potential
exposure to additional liability."29
C. A Bump in the Road: Arthur Young
The Supreme Court considered whether work-product protection
would extend to audit workpapers in United States v. Arthur Young.30
In Arthur Young, the Supreme Court considered whether "tax accrual
workpapers prepared by a corporation's independent certified public
accountant in the course of regular financial audits are protected
from disclosure in response to an Internal Revenue Service
summons."8 '
During a routine audit of Arthur Young's client, Amerada Hess
Corp., the IRS learned that Amerada had made questionable pay-
ments from a special disbursement account.32 The IRS initiated a
criminal investigation and issued an administrative summons to
Arthur Young for its Amerada files, including the tax accrual
workpapers.33 Amerada ordered Arthur Young not to comply with the
summons.34
The IRS instituted an enforcement action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the District
Court declined to recognize an accountant-client privilege.35 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, find-
ing it necessary "that some form of privilege be carved out to protect
the independent auditing process."36 Relying on Hickman, the Sec-
ond Circuit said that promoting full disclosure to public accountants
a tax position reported" on the schedule. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41
I.R.B. 432-33. It is not clear whether this policy of restraint applies to litigation. For
additional information, see generally Julia Ushakova, Seeking Privileged Information
Under Schedule UTP: Protections and Privileges for Taxpayers, 9 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
445 (2011) (discussing the requirements of Schedule UTP, the policy of restraint, and
the impact on the work-product doctrine).
29 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984).
30 See id.
31 Id. at 807.
32 Id. at 808.
33 Id. at 808-09.
34 Id. at 809.
35 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F.Supp. 1152, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
36 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 1982).
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would ensure the accuracy and trustworthiness of data available in
securities markets. 3
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and declined to
recognize either an accountant-client privilege or work-product
immunity for auditor's workpapers.38 Reasoning that independent
auditors have a "public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client," the Court said that to "insulate from dis-
closure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's
financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the
accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public
obligations."3 9
D. Forks in the Road: Interpreting "In Anticipation of Litigation"
While Arthur Young declined to extend privilege to accountants
or recognize work-product immunity for auditors' workpapers, tradi-
tional notions of work product, including attorney-client work prod-
uct, remained intact after the decision. Under Hickman and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (3), if a document is "prepared in antici-
pation of litigation," it is generally not discoverable until after the pro-
ducing party redacts any attorney opinions or impressions. But soon
after Arthur Young, the federal circuits began to disagree about what
meets the "in anticipation" standard. The Fifth Circuit applies the
stringent "primary purpose" test, while most other Circuit Courts use
the less rigorous "because of' test.4 0
37 See id.
38 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 821.
39 Id. at 817-18.
40 The "because of" test has been adopted in at least nine circuits, including the
D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th
Cir. 2010); In re Prof Is Direct Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz &
Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2002); Montgomery Cnty. v. Microvote
Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. AdIman, 134 F.3d 1194,1195
(2d Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992). The First
Circuit adopted the test in 2002. Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68
(1st Cir. 2002). But as will be discussed in Part I.D.3, infra, the First Circuit in Textron
used a modified version of the "because of test."
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1. The Road Less Traveled: The "Primary Motivating Purpose"
Test
The Fifth Circuit adopted the "primary motivating purpose" test
in 1982 in United States v. El Paso Co.41 Under this test, a document is
protected against discovery in litigation only when the primary moti-
vating purpose for its creation is to aid in litigation.4 2 El Paso, a large
public conglomerate, received a summons from the IRS for "any docu-
ment, memorandum, letter, or work papers which identify potential
tax liabilities or tax problems."4 3 The head of El Paso's tax depart-
ment declined to provide the documents, so the IRS petitioned to
compel production. 4 4 The U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas ruled for the government, and El Paso appealed. 4 5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding
that El Paso's primary motivating purpose in creating the documents
was "to bring its financial books into conformity with generally
accepted auditing principles" as required by federal securities laws
and not "to ready El Paso for litigation over its tax returns." 46
With apologies to Robert Frost,47 the road less traveled is gener-
ally not taken for good reason. The "primary motivating purpose test"
has been viewed as unduly inflexible and at odds with the intent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48 As the Second Circuit has
observed, "Nowhere does Rule 26(b) (3) state that a document must
have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to con-
stitute work product, much less primarily or exclusively to aid in litiga-
tion. Preparing a document 'in anticipation of litigation' is
sufficient."49 Further, unlike the "because of' test, the "primary moti-
vating purpose" test ignores so-called "dual purpose" documents
41 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
42 See id. at 542.
43 Id. at 533.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 543. Notably, the Fifth Circuit found that the tax analysis was "not pre-
pared to respond to a specific charge by the IRS or to any pending or impending law
suit." Id. at 535. However, Rule 26(b) (3) does not require that litigation be either
pending or threatened, but instead merely requires that a document be prepared "in
anticipation of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
47 See ROBERT FROST, THE RoAD NOT TAKEN 270 (2002).
48 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing the El
Paso test as at "odds with the text and the policies of the Rule").
49 Id.
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which are prepared for other business reasons but contain an attor-
ney's mental impressions.5 0
2. The Beaten Path: The "Because Of' Test
The "because of' test is the more frequently applied interpreta-
tion of "in anticipation of litigation."5 1 Under this test, a document is
protected only when "'in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said
to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litiga-
tion.' " 52
Unlike the "primary motivating purpose" test, the "because of'
test is more flexible, recognizing that documents can contain work
product even if they are created for use in business decisions. For
example, in AdIman, the IRS sought production of a document pre-
pared by an attorney and accountant at Arthur Andersen & Co. for its
client, Sequa Corporation.5 3 The document, which evaluated the tax
implications of a potential restructuring, 54 was essentially a "litigation
analysis prepared . . . to inform a business decision which turns on
the ... assessment of the likely outcome of litigation."55 The Second
Circuit found that "[w]here a document is created because of the
prospect of litigation, analyzing the likely outcome of that litigation, it
does not lose protection under this formulation merely because it is
created in order to assist with a business decision."56
The Second Circuit asserted that the "because of' test accorded
better with the plain meaning of Rule 26(b) (3) than the "primary
motivating purpose" test.5 7 Further, the Second Circuit found the
"because of' test desirable because of the rule's inclusiveness-in that
documents containing an attorney's "mental impressions" would be
50 The Second Circuit also reasoned that "[w]here the Rule has explicitly estab-
lished a special level of protection against disclosure for documents revealing an
attorney's ... opinions . . . it would oddly undermine its purposes if such documents
were excluded from protection merely because they were prepared to assist in the
making of a business decision expected to result in the litigation." Id. at 1199.
51 See supra note 40 (discussing the use of the "because of" test among several
circuits).
52 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting In re
Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
53 AdIman, 134 F.3d at 1194.
54 Id. at 1195.
55 Id. at 1197.
56 Id. at 1202.
57 Id.; see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (explaining why the "pri-
mary motivating purpose" test is inflexible and at odds with the plain meaning of the
rules).
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protected-and exclusiveness-in that ordinary, nonlitigation busi-
ness documents would not receive protection.58
3. The Road to Ruin: Textron's "Prepared for Use in Litigation"
Test
In 2009, the First Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Textron pur-
portedly using the "because of' test.5 9 Despite similarities to AdIman,
however, the two cases came out remarkably different, and the Textron
dissent-as well as scholarly commentators-have asserted that Tex-
tron used a new "prepared for use in litigation" test rather than the
"because of' test.6 0
In Textron, the IRS issued a summons for the tax accrual
workpapers maintained by Textron's auditor, Ernst & Young, for nine
questionable tax positions. 6 1 Reversing the District of Rhode Island
and vacating a prior First Circuit panel, the Textron majority found
that the documents did not qualify for protection because the "work
papers were prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor
approval," not because of litigation.62 The majority held that "[i]t is
not enough to trigger work-product protection that the subject matter
of a document relates to a subject that might conceivably be liti-
gated."63 Rather, the documents must be prepared for use in possible
litigation. 64
The dissent in Textron was scathing. Judge Torruella, joined by
Judge Lipez, said that the majority had ignored previous First Circuit
precedent and devised a new "prepared for use in litigation" test that
was even narrower than the Fifth Circuit's "primary motivating pur-
pose" test. 65 Repeating many of Adlman's criticisms of El Paso, the
dissent described the majority's new rule as being inflexible and at
odds with the plain meaning of Rule 26(b) (3). But the dissent also
58 Id. at 1203 (explaining that the "because of" test is desirable because it "appro-
priately focuses on both what should be eligible for the Rule's protection and what
should not").
59 See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
60 See id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see also Adam M. Braun, Note, Open
Reserve-ations?: United States v. Textron Inc. and Its Application to International Tax
Accounting, 86 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 823, 834-35 (2011) (agreeing with the dissent that
Textron may have created a third split among the Federal Circuits).
61 Textron, 577 F.3d at 23-24.
62 Id. at 31.
63 Id. at 29.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting). Notably, Judge Torruella and Judge Lipez
were the majority on the three-judge panel that had previously heard the case.
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characterized the Textron majority as being at odds with Hickman,
asserting that the majority ignored the "fundamental concern of [that
opinion] with protecting an attorney's 'privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.'" 6 6
II. THE ROAD TO RECOVERY: THE D.C. CIRCUIT REINVIGORATES THE
WORK-PRODUcT DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES
v. DELoITTE & TOUCHE
The Deloitte case, a discovery dispute, arose from tax litigation
involving the "treatment of two partnerships owned by Dow Chemical
Company" and its wholly-owned subsidiaries.6 7 In 2005, Dow chal-
lenged IRS adjustments made to partnership returns filed by the two
partnerships, Chemtech Royalty Associates, L.P. ("Chemtech I") and
Chemtech II, L.P. ("Chemtech II").68 During discovery, the IRS sub-
poenaed several documents from Dow's independent auditor,
Deloitte & Touche USA, LLP.6 9 Deloitte produced many of the
requested documents, but it declined to do so for three documents
that Dow had identified as attorney work product.70 Deloitte also
declined to provide documents held by its Swiss counterpart, Deloitte
Switzerland.7 1
The first document, called the "Deloitte Memorandum," was a
"1993 draft memorandum prepared by Deloitte that summarize[d] a
meeting between Dow employees, Dow's outside counsel, and Deloitte
employees about the possibility of litigation over the Chemtech I part-
nership, and the necessity of accounting for such a possibility in an
ongoing audit."72 Prior to the meeting, Deloitte had warned Dow of
66 Id. at 35 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)).




71 United States v. Deloitte & Touche USA, 623 F.Supp.2d 39, 40 (D.D.C. 2009).
The government argued that Deloitte USA had possession over the documents at the
Swiss firm under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 45(a) (1) (A) (iii) because
Deloitte USA maintained sufficient control over Deloitte Switzerland. See id. The Dis-
trict Court found this "unpersuasive," holding that while "Deloitte USA and Deloitte
Switzerland are both members of the Swiss verein-or membership organization-
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, the United States has failed to establish that Deloitte USA
has the 'the [sic] legal right, authority or ability to obtain documents upon demand'
from Deloitte Switzerland." Id. at 41 (quoting U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. ASAT, Inc.,
411 F.3d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The District Court's ruling on the Swiss docu-
ments was not appealed, and the subject is beyond the scope of this Note.
72 Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 133.
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the possibility of litigation relating to the Chemtech I partnership's
tax treatment.73
The second document was a "1998 memorandum and flow chart
prepared by two Dow employees-an accountant and an in-house
attorney," and the third was "a 2005 tax opinion prepared by Dow's
outside counsel."74 William Curry, Dow's Director of Taxes, recorded
in Dow's privilege log that the second and third documents-referred
to by the court as the "Dow Documents"-were given to Deloitte so
that the accounting firm could "'review the adequacy of Dow's contin-
gency reserves for the Chemtech transactions.' "7' Deloitte, according
to Curry, compelled the disclosure of the documents by threatening
to issue a qualified audit opinion.7 6 All three documents, according
to the privilege log, were prepared "in anticipation of litigation."7 7
Although the tax litigation was filed in the Middle District of Lou-
isiana, because production was sought in Washington, D.C., the gov-
ernment filed the motion to compel in the District Court for the
District of Columbia.78 The District Court denied the motion to com-
pel without reviewing the documents in camera, holding that they
were "protected from discovery as attorney work-product because they
were created in anticipation of future litigation over the tax treat-
ment" of the Chemtech partnerships. 79 The District Court also held
that Dow did not waive privilege claims over the documents when it
disclosed them to Deloitte USA.80
Because the motion to compel was the only matter before the
District Court, the ruling was a final appealable judgment, and the
government sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.81 The government conceded on
appeal that the Dow Documents were work product, but maintained
that the Deloitte Memorandum was not.82 The government also
argued that work-product protection was waived for all three docu-
ments by disclosure to Deloitte.83
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 133-34
76 Id. at 133.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 United States v. Deloitte & Touche USA, 623 F. Supp. 2d 39, 40 (D.D.C. 2009).
80 Id. at 41. For discussion, see infra Part III.
81 Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 134.
82 Id.
83 Id. For discussion, see infra Part III.
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A. Applying the "Because Of" Test: Deloitte Rebuffs Textron
and Redeems Work product
The government advanced two arguments that the Deloitte Mem-
orandum was not work product. First, it argued that because
Deloitte-and not Dow-prepared the memorandum, the document
could not qualify for work-product protection. 4 Secondly, it argued
that the memorandum could not be work product because the memo
was prepared as part of the audit process, not in anticipation of litiga-
tion. 85 The D.C. Circuit rejected both arguments. 86
Rule 26(b) (3) applies to documents prepared by a party or its
representative.8 7 The government first argued that Deloitte is not
Dow's representative, relying on Arthur Young's refrain that auditors
owe their primary responsibilities to the investing public.88 In the gov-
ernment's view, under Arthur Young, Deloitte cannot be Dow's repre-
sentative, and resultantly, the Deloitte Memorandum cannot be work
product under the plain language of Rule 26(b) (3) .89 Dow countered
that the "representative" for purposes of the work-product doctrine is
its counsel, whose thoughts and opinions are recorded in the
document.90
The D.C. Circuit, in rejecting the government's argument, agreed
with Dow and found that Rule 26(b) (3) does not contain an exhaus-
tive list of what is work product; Hickman was only partially codified by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.91 According to the court, any
document containing the "mental impressions" of an attorney can
qualify for work-product protection, as can intangible items.92 Conse-
quently, the government was incorrect in focusing on who created the
document, because "the question is not who created the document or
how they are related to the party asserting work-product protection,
but whether the document contains work product-the thoughts and
opinions of counsel developed in anticipation of litigation."93 Accord-
84 See id. at 135.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (A).
88 See Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 135.
89 See id at 136.
90 See id. Dow also argued that the Deloitte Memorandum contained the same
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ingly, the D.C. Circuit ruled that "Deloitte's preparation of the docu-
ment does not exclude the possibility that it contains Dow's work."94
The government also argued that the Deloitte Memorandum was
not work product because it was prepared during an annual audit, not
in preparation for litigation.95 Essentially, the government, relying on
El Paso and Textron, was arguing that the function of a document-not
its content-determines whether it is work product.96 The D.C. Cir-
cuit dismissed this argument.97 Relying on Adlman, the court said
"material developed in anticipation of litigation can be incorporated
into a document produced during an audit without ceasing to be
work-product."98 The court, as a parting shot, distinguished and criti-
cized Textron, implying that the First Circuit did not use the "because
of' test.99
After rejecting the government's two categorical arguments, the
D.C. Circuit concluded "that the district court did not have a suffi-
cient evidentiary foundation for its holding that the memorandum
was purely work-product." 00 Accordingly, the case was remanded on
this issue.' 0
B. The Impact on Tax Court Decisions
Because the D.C. Circuit Court's evidence rulings govern the
United States Tax Court, the Deloitte ruling is perhaps the most signifi-
cant of the federal circuit court decisions. Tax Court Rule 143 (a) pro-
vides that the rules of evidence applicable to bench trials in the
District of Columbia district court apply in Tax Court proceedings.102
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which bind the D.C. District Court,
provide that the rules of privilege and protection at a jurisdiction's
common law govern. 03 Thus, after Deloitte, the "because of' test will
control evidentiary rulings in the United States Tax Court.
94 Id. at 136.
95 See id.
96 Id. at 137.
97 See id. at 138.
98 Id.
99 See id. ("Judge Torruella's dissenting opinion in Textron makes a strong argu-
ment that while the court said it was applying the 'because of' test, it actually asked
whether the documents were 'prepared for use in possible litigation,' a much more
exacting standard.").
100 Id.
101 See id. at 139.
102 T.C.R. 143(a).
103 FED. R. EVID. 501.
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III. A RoADMAP DISCOVERED: DELoIrE's ANALYSIS OF
WORK-PRODUCT WAIVER
While the government conceded that the Dow Documents were
work product, it argued that Dow waived any protection when it pro-
vided the documents to Deloitte.104 As the D.C. Circuit acknowl-
edged, few, if any, federal appellate courts had previously decided
whether disclosing work product to an independent auditor consti-
tuted waiver.105 Dozens of district courts had previously addressed the
issue, but they did so with a shocking lack of uniformity, leading to a
convoluted maze of case law. 06 Accordingly, Deloitte's waiver analysis is
perhaps the most significant aspect of the opinion: as the first federal
circuit court to comment on waiver in the context of financial state-
ment audits, the D.C. Circuit's analysis will doubtlessly prove influen-
tial, and will shape the work-product doctrine well into the future.
A. Wandering Aimlessly: The Diverging Paths of the District Courts
Among the district courts that have evaluated waiver, the over-
whelming majority have found no waiver,107 although the reasoning as
to why has varied greatly. For example, in Regions Financial Corp. v.
United States,108 the Northern District of Alabama found no waiver
because there is "no conceivable scenario in which [the auditor]
would file a lawsuit against Regions because of something [the audi-
tor] learned from [the] disclosures" and because the disclosed
workpapers were protected by a confidentiality agreement.109 Con-
trastingly, in Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household International,
104 See Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 139.
105 See id. While it may appear shocking that no circuit court has previously
addressed the waiver issue, Professor MatthewJ. Barrett has offered an explanation:
"The fact that parties generally cannot appeal discovery orders until the court has
entered a judgment perhaps explains the paucity of appellate opinions. By that time,
the litigants may have concluded that the legal issues that arose in discovery do not
merit pursuing on appeal." MATTHEW J. BARRErr, AccoUNTING FOR LAwYERs: 2011
SUPPLEMENT 179 (2011).
106 See infra, notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
107 See Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 139.
108 Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL
2139008 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008), appeal dismissed, No. 08-13866 (11th Cir. Dec. 30,
2008). The IRS appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, but subsequently moved to dismiss
after the IRS reportedly obtained the requested documents in a settlement. See Amy
S. Elliott, Hochman Downplays Significance of Regions Settlement Despite Textron Appeal,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Jan. 13, 2009, at 7-5.
109 Id. at 90.
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Inc., 10 the Northern District of Illinois focused on the fact that
" [d] isclosing documents to an auditor does not substantially increase
the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the informa-
tion.""1  But in Merrill Lynch & Co., v. Allegheny Energy, Inc.," 2 the
Southern District of New York focused on the nature of the auditor-
client relationship and found that "any tension between an auditor
and a corporation that arises from an auditor's need to scrutinize and
investigate a corporation's records and bookkeeping practices simply
is not the equivalent of an adversarial relationship contemplated by
the work-product doctrine."1 13
At least two courts, however, have found waiver. In Medinol Ltd.
v. Boston Scientific Corp.,'14 the Southern District of New York-the
same court as in Merrill Lynch-found waiver when minutes and
materials of a special litigation committee were disclosed to Boston
Scientific's auditors." 5 Finding that there was no "common interest"
or common adversary, the court ruled that the "privacy interests that
the work-product doctrine was intended to protect" were not served
and therefore waived.' 16 In In re Diasonics Securities Litigation, the
Northern District of California, citing Arthur Young, found waiver
because the "relationship between public accountant and client is at
odds with [protection] . .. because the public accountant has respon-
sibilities to creditors, stockholders, and the investing public which
transcend the relationship with the client."1 7
Thus, there had been a severe lack of uniformity among the dis-
trict courts, with each court focusing on dramatically different ele-
ments. Whereas Diasonics found the auditor-client relationship to be
adversarial, Merrill Lynch found the exact opposite. Whereas Regions
110 Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l Inc., 237 F.R.D. 176 (N.D.
Ill. 2006).
111 Id. at 183 (quoting Vandon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D. 528, 534
(N.D. Ill. 2003). Interestingly, in Jaffe, the auditor inadvertently disclosed the docu-
ments to the adversary. The court declined to find waiver even under these circum-
stances, finding that courts must weigh "five factors to determine whether waiver has
occurred under such circumstances: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken
to protect the document; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of
discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness."
Id. (citing Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. DPIC Cos., 203 F.R.D. 376, 380 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
112 Merill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
113 Id. at 448.
114 Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
115 See id. at 115-17.
116 Id. at 117.
117 In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4584-RFP, 1986 WL 53402, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 15, 1986) (unpublished decision).
2012] ON THE ROAD AGAIN 1813
focused on whether the auditor and client would oppose each other
in future litigation, Medinol focused on whether there was a common
adversary. And others, such as Jaffe, emphasized the degree to which
the communication would remain confidential. With such diversity of
opinions-and no appellate precedent-the law had become a con-
fusing maze, and Deloitte provided much needed guidance on work-
product waiver.
B. Much-Needed Directions: Deloitte 's Analysis of Work-Product Waiver
As the Deloitte majority observed, while voluntary disclosure waives
attorney-client privilege, it does not necessarily waive work-product
protection.1 18 The court explained:
[T]he attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine serve
different purposes: the former protects the attorney-client relation-
ship by safeguarding confidential communications, whereas the lat-
ter promotes the adversary process by insulating an attorney's
litigation preparation from discovery. Voluntary disclosure waives
the attorney-client privilege because it is inconsistent with the confi-
dential attorney-client relationship. Voluntary disclosure does not
necessarily waive work-product protection, however, because it does
not necessarily undercut the adversary process.' 19
Nonetheless, the court continued, disclosure can constitute waiver if
that disclosure undercuts the adversarial process and is "'inconsistent
with the maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adver-
sary."' 120 Essentially, if disclosing to "an adversary or a conduit to an
adversary," work-product protection is waived. 121
The government argued that Dow and Deloitte were potential
adversaries because companies and their independent auditors rou-
tinely become involved in various disputes.12 2 The D.C. Circuit dis-
missed this argument, declaring that Deloitte could not serve as the
auditor if there were any pending or threatened litigation between the
two firms because Deloitte's independence would be impaired.123
Further, the D.C. Circuit explained, the test "is not whether Deloitte
could be Dow's adversary in any conceivable future litigation, but
118 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
119 Id. at 139-40 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 140 (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 235 F.3d 598,
605 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, Professional Standards § 101.08
(Am. Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005)).
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whether Deloitte could be Dow's adversary in the sort of litigation the
Dow Documents address." 24 If the former were the test, the court
reasoned, any disclosure would constitute waiver.125
The court then found that Dow and Deloitte could not be adver-
saries in the sort of litigation the Dow Documents addressed.126 The
court deduced that Dow anticipated a dispute with the IRS, not with
Deloitte: "The documents, which concern the tax implications of the
Chemtech partnerships, would not likely be relevant in any dispute
Dow might have with Deloitte. Thus Deloitte cannot be considered a
potential adversary with respect to the Dow Documents."127
The government also argued that Dow and Deloitte were adversa-
ries because "independent auditors have the power to issue opinions
that adversely affect their clients."128 The D.C. Circuit also dismissed
this argument, citing Merrill Lynch and concluding that "any tension
between an auditor and a corporation that arises from an auditor's
need to scrutinize and investigate a corporation's records and book-
keeping practices simply is not the equivalent of an adversarial rela-
tionship contemplated by the work-product doctrine." 129
The government relied heavily on United States v. Massachusetts
Institute of Technoloy 30 (MIT) for its argument. MIT, a contractor
under investigation by the Department of Defense, claimed work-
product protection for several expense reports it had given to the
Defense Contract Audit Agency, a component of the Department of
Defense.131 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
found waiver because MIT had given the documents to its most likely
adversary, the Department of Defense.132 In Deloitte, the D.C. Circuit
rejected any similarity between the two cases, calling them "wholly dif-
ferent" because MIT "disclosed its work product not to an indepen-




127 Id. Interestingly, large accounting firms routinely provide both audit and tax
services to clients. The waiver outcome could conceivably be difficult in a situation
where Deloitte was not only the auditor, but also the tax preparer: in this situation,
there might be an adversarial relationship in an audit, refund, or even malpractice
action. In the research for this Note, no cases were found which addressed this issue.
128 Id.
129 Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
130 United States v. Mass. Institute of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
131 See id. at 682-83.
132 See id. at 687.
133 Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 141.
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Finally, the government argued that Deloitte was a conduit to a
potential adversary. 13 4 The D.C. Circuit explained that two discrete
inquiries are used to determine whether the "maintenance of secrecy"
standard has been met.13 5 First, a court must determine "whether the
disclosing party has engaged in self-interested selective disclosure by
revealing its work product to some adversaries but not to others," with
selective disclosure indicating waiver. 13 6 Second, a court must assess
"whether the disclosing party had a reasonable basis for believing that
the recipient would keep the disclosed material confidential." 13 7 The
court explained that "[a] reasonable expectation of confidentiality
may derive from common litigation interests between the disclosing
party and the recipient" or from "a confidentiality agreement or simi-
lar arrangement." 1
On the "selective disclosure" inquiry, the D.C. Circuit found that
because Dow had not given the documents to any potential adversa-
ries, Dow did not waive work-product protection.'3 9 On the "reasona-
ble expectation of confidentiality" inquiry, the court found that while
the two parties did not have common litigation interests, "Deloitte, as
an independent auditor, ha[d] an obligation to refrain from disclos-
ing confidential client information." 4 0
Interestingly, the Deloitte opinion incorporated many of the
waiver elements used by the various district courts. While the D.C.
Circuit explicitly cited Merrill Lynch for the proposition that the audi-
tor-client relationship is not tantamount to an adversarial one,14 ' cri-
teria from other cases appear prominently in the D.C. Circuit's
analysis. Jaffe's examination of whether disclosure to a party substan-
tially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the
information is the central theme in the two-part "maintenance of
secrecy" standard. ' 42 Medinol's "common interest" or "common adver-
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 Id. (citations omitted).
137 Id. (citations omitted).
138 Id. (citations omitted).
139 Id. at 142.
140 Id. (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, Professional Standards § 301.01
(Am. Inst. Of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005)). The government countered that
Rule 301 "shall not be construed . . . to affect in any way the member's obligation to
comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons." Id. However, as
the D.C. Circuit explained, "[A] n assertion of work-product protection challenges the
enforceability of a subpoena with respect to those materials." Id.
141 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text
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sary" test is part of the "reasonable expectation of confidentiality"
inquiry,143 as is Regions's focus on the confidentiality agreement.14 4
Indeed, the only district court opinion that is clearly-even if not
explicitly-rebuffed is Diasonics, which relied heavily on Arthur Young
in holding that the "relationship between public accountant and cli-
ent is at odds with [protection] . . . because the public accountant has
responsibilities to creditors, stockholders, and the investing public
which transcend the relationship with the client."145 Calling any reli-
ance on Arthur Young misplaced, the D.C. Circuit pointed out that
Arthur Young "considered whether accountant work-product should be
granted the same protection attorney work-product receives," not
whether the auditor's use of attorney work product should lack
protection.146
Finally, the D.C. Circuit explained several policy considerations
with regard to waiver. Recognizing that they are "mindful that inde-
pendent auditors have significant leverage over the companies whose
finances they audit," the D.C. Circuit claimed "[a] n auditor can essen-
tially compel disclosure by refusing to provide an unqualified opinion
otherwise."1 4 7 Requiring waiver on such disclosures, the court rea-
soned, would undermine the adversarial model envisioned in Hickman
by discouraging companies from seeking robust legal advice and com-
pletely and accurately disclosing that information to independent
auditors. 14 8 Further, allowing waiver would make reality of Justice
Jackson's great fear and allow the government to litigate "'on wits bor-
rowed from the adversary.'"
1 49
In conclusion, Deloitte, using many of the standards espoused by
the district courts, provided a legal map of a previously convoluted
case law.15 0 After Deloitte, independent auditors are adversaries for
work-product purposes only to the extent that litigation is actually
contemplated between the auditing firm and the client.15' Further-
more, auditors are not per se conduits to potential adversaries, as
143 See supra notesl14-116 and accompanying text
144 See supra note 109 and accompanying text
145 In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4584-RFP, 1986 WL 53402, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 15, 1986) (unpublished decision). See supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
146 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
147 Id.
148 See id.
149 Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947)).
150 See supra Part III.
151 See supra Part III.
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auditors' professional standards help clients meet the "maintenance
of secrecy" standard.152
IV. A ROAD PAVED WITH GOLD: WHY DELOITTE GOT IT RIGHT
ON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
A. On the Road Again: Why Deloitte Is Right on
the Work-Product Doctrine
Deloitte, as the first federal circuit decision to come after Textron
on this issue, was reason for relief among corporate counsel. The
Deloitte decision effectively rebuffed the Textron decision, thereby rein-
vigorating the work-product doctrine. Nonetheless, Textron still has
the force of law in the First Circuit, and El Paso has the force of law in
the Fifth Circuit. Meanwhile, companies with nationwide operations
face considerable uncertainty regarding which work-product standard
will apply if the IRS summonses any documents containing work prod-
uct.15 3 Because the IRS may serve a summons in the United States
district court for the district in which such person resides, 54 compa-
nies with operations in the First or Fifth Circuits will not know which
work-product protection standard will apply until the summons has
been delivered.
Deloitte, unlike Textron and El Paso, provides a sound legal frame-
work rooted in statute and longstanding case law. Further, weighing
the public policy considerations reveals that Deloitte is faithful to the
spirit of Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3). Accordingly, should the circuit
court split be resolved in the future, the Supreme Court or Congress
should take the beaten path and use the "because of' test.
1. Respecting the Plain Meaning of Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3)
The plain meaning of Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3) gravitates
towards the "because of' test used by Deloitte and most other circuits.
As the Second Circuit observed in AdIman, "Nowhere does Rule
26(b) (3) state that a document must have been prepared to aid in the
conduct of litigation in order to constitute work-product, much less
primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation. Preparing a document 'in
anticipation of litigation' is sufficient." 5 5 In this regard, El Paso and
Textron misconstrue the law by requiring that a document be pre-
152 See supra Part III.
153 SeeJoy A. Williamson, Note, The Scope and Application of the Work Product Doctrine
As Applied to Dual-Purpose Documents, 30 VA. TAx REv. 715, 728-30 (2011).
154 I.R.C. § 7604(a) (2006).
155 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998).
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pared for use in litigation or with litigation as the primary motivating
purpose.
Further, as Hickman made clear, whether a document contains
work product is not a result of its function, but rather a result of
whether the document contains an attorney's mental impressions.15 6
The work-product doctrine as envisioned in Hickman was intended to
prevent opposing counsel from having access to an attorney's
thoughts, trial strategies, and legal theories. As the Second Circuit
stated in Adiman:
Where the Rule has explicitly established a special level of protec-
tion against disclosure for documents revealing an attorney's (or
other representative's) opinions . . . it would oddly undermine its
purposes if such documents were excluded from protection merely
because they were prepared to assist in the making of a business
decision expected to result in the litigation.157
In this regard, the Textron and El Paso tests are unduly narrow and are
an affront to Hickman and the plain meaning of Rule 26(b) (3): they
deny protection based solely on function, ignoring the underlying
content.
2. Preserving the Adversarial System
As Justice Jackson observed in Hickman, the work-product doc-
trine preserved the adversarial system by disallowing parties from liti-
gating on the intelligence, research, and cunning of their
adversaries.1 58 The Advisory Committee's notes also reflected this pol-
icy goal: " [E]ach side's informal evaluation of its case should be pro-
tected ... each side should be encouraged to prepare independently,
and . . . one side should not automatically have the benefit of the
detailed preparatory work of the other side."15 9
As explained in Arthur Young, the IRS would benefit greatly from
being able to obtain tax accrual workpapers. These documents imme-
diately reveal the tax positions the IRS is interested in "by highlighting
those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken a position that
may, at some later date, require the payment of additional taxes" and
by providing "an item-by-item analysis of the corporation's potential
exposure to additional liability."16 0 Indeed, the IRS, in Textron, has
156 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
157 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199.
158 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
159 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
160 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984).
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admitted that this is exactly why they wanted the documents that were
at issue in that case.1 61
Allowing access to these workpapers, however, shifts the cost of
tax enforcement onto companies with a need for audit services. This
would allow the IRS to "free ride" on the detailed preparatory work of
the companies it seeks enforcement against, and the adverse incen-
tives could lead to unintended consequences. For example, the IRS,
armed with limited resources, would have an incentive to go after only
the proverbial low-hanging fruit, disproportionately seeking enforce-
ment actions against independently audited companies. The IRS
would have little reason to do its own robust legal analysis, as it could
rely on the efforts of its opponents. Moreover, revealing a corporate
attorney's private assessment of success to the IRS would greatly
inhibit the ability of lawyers to represent their clients and advantage
the IRS: the corporation would essentially be playing poker with an
open hand. Moreover, the IRS would be able to force settlements,
even in cases where the company had a defensible tax position. As
Judge Torruella observed in the Textron dissent:
Textron's [workpapers] contain exactly the sort of mental impres-
sions about the case that Hickman sought to protect. In fact, these
percentages contain counsel's ultimate impression of the value of
the case.... With this information, the IRS will be able to immedi-
ately identify weak spots and know exactly how much Textron
should be willing to spend to settle each item.16 2
3. Ensuring Robust and Well-Documented Legal Representation
One of the chief concerns of Hickman was ensuring the quality of
legal representation. As the Supreme Court observed, the "effect on
the legal profession [of permitting discovery] would be demoralizing"
and the "interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served."165 The Court also asserted that " [w] ere such materials
open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put
down in writing would remain unwritten." 16 4
If the work-product tests focus on a document's content, as was
the case in Deloitte, "attorneys preparing preventative or pre-transac-
tion legal advice can conduct a comprehensive analysis of the situa-
161 United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting) ("Indeed, the IRS explicitly admits that this is its purpose in seeking the
documents.").
162 Id.
163 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
164 Id.
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tion and reduce their assessments to writing because they will have
assurance that their work-product will be undiscoverable regardless of
the functional document into which their thoughts and opinions are
incorporated."1 65 However, if the focus is on a document's purpose,
attorneys may be forced to question whether to memorialize their
thoughts in writing: doing so could cause harm to their client if the
document was discovered merely because it was the wrong kind of
dual-purpose document. 166 Judge Torruella articulated this in the
Textron dissent: "[I]f attorneys who identify good faith questions and
uncertainties in their clients' tax returns know that putting such infor-
mation in writing will result in discovery by the IRS, they will be more
likely to avoid putting it in writing, thus diminishing the quality of
representation. "167
4. Promoting Completeness and Accuracy in Financial Reporting
Arguably, the most compelling reason to protect dual-purpose
documents under the "because of' test is to ensure completeness and
accuracy in financial reporting. As explained above, after El Paso and
Textron, lawyers may be hesitant to put their thoughts in writing. But
even more dire consequences can come from their being less than
candid in their analysis of the tax liability, and after El Paso and Tex-
tron, companies have every incentive to engage in a financial numbers
game. Attorneys can easily underestimate the total reserve by con-
servatively estimating the potential liability or risk of loss. And in a
system where the IRS has free access to information and can force
settlements, 168 companies would have every incentive to "game" the
numbers and lower their liability, particularly where it would help
them meet earnings estimates.
While it is true that auditors must conduct their own analysis of a
client's tax accrual reserves, the audit process necessitates a review of
the client's analysis for reasonableness. Accordingly, it is essential that
tax documents be provided to the auditor; otherwise, they simply will
not be able to evaluate the reserves for adequacy. Furthermore, even
if the auditor did somehow independently determine that the client's
numbers were misstated, they would only request an adjustment based
on materiality. As such, in this realm, the auditor does not provide an
effective check against corporate attorneys who are incentivized to be
less than candid.
165 Williamson, supra note 153, at 741.
166 Id. at 741-42.
167 Textron, 577 F.3d at 36-37 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
168 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Textron and El Paso's proponents argue that there should not be
truthfulness in external financial reporting alone, but also in tax
reporting. As the Textron majority stated, "tax collection is not a
game. Underpaying taxes threatens the essential public interest in
revenue collection. If a blueprint to Textron's possible improper
deductions can be found in Textron's files, it is properly available to
the government. .. ."169 But this argument is a red herring and puts
tax collection above all else, including the aforementioned policy con-
siderations. 170 And it runs roughshod over established notions of
work product. As the dissent in Textron asserted, "[t]he scope of the
work-product doctrine should not depend on what party is asserting
it," yet that is exactly what the Textron majority did with that statement:
they give special consideration to the IRS.171
B. Merging Forked Paths: Why Deloitte Is Right on Waiver
As the Deloitte majority observed, while voluntary disclosure waives
attorney-client privilege, it does not necessarily waive work-product
protection because it does not undercut the adversarial process. 172
Thus, to the extent that Deloitte's holding protects the adversarial pro-
cess, it upholds the intent of Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3).
The Deloitte majority correctly found that nothing per se places
auditors and clients in an adversarial relationship. As the D.C. Circuit
observed, if any auditor-client dispute results in pending or
threatened litigation, the auditor's independence would be
impaired.173 The government argued that auditors and clients rou-
tinely become involved in litigation, but as the court found, the test is
not whether the auditor could be the client's adversary in any conceiv-
able future litigation, but whether the auditor could be the client's
adversary in the sort of litigation the work-product documents con-
template. 174 Otherwise, given the vast universe of possible litigation,
voluntary disclosure to a third party would almost always result in
waiver.
169 Textron, 577 F.3d at 31.
170 This is essentially the case with all forms of privilege. As Jeremy Bentham
claimed, legal privilege obscures the truth in pursuit of other objectives. 8 JOHN
HENRY WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2291 (McNaughton rev., Lit-
tle, Brown & Co. 1961).
171 Textron, 577 F.3d at 37 (Tortuella, J., dissenting).
172 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
173 Id. at 140 (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Professional Standards,
§ 101.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005)).
174 Id.
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The more difficult question resolved in Deloitte is whether audi-
tors and clients are adversaries because, as the government argued,
"independent auditors have the power to issue opinions that adversely
affect their clients."' 75 The Northern District of California, citing
Arthur Young, had previously found waiver because the "relationship
between public accountant and client is at odds with [waiver] . . .
because the public accountant has responsibilities to creditors, stock-
holders, and the investing public which transcend the relationship
with the client."176 The D.C. Circuit, citing Merrill Lynch, disagreed
and held that "'any tension between an auditor and a corporation
that arises from an auditor's need to scrutinize and investigate a cor-
poration's records and book-keeping practices simply is not the
equivalent of an adversarial relationship contemplated by the work-
product doctrine."
1 77
Within the plain meaning of the work-product doctrine, the
Deloitte and Merrill Lynch opinions better align with the spirit and
intent of Hickman and Rule 26(b) (3). Hickman was not seeking to
preserve any type of adversarial relationship; rather, it was attempting
to preserve an adversarial relationship in litigation.178 The Supreme
Court affirmed this in United States v. Nobles, 179 in which the court
explained that the work-product doctrine "is an intensely practical
one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system." 80
An independent audit simply is not litigation, is not tantamount to
litigation, and often is not even adversarial: the client chooses the
auditor and agrees upon a fee. Indeed, the relationship is, at its core,
aligned in interest: the auditor joins the client in the effort to release
fairly presented financial statements, and both parties seek to root out
fraud and eliminate corruption.' 8 '
A novel argument can be made that by turning documents over
to an independent auditor, one is essentially giving the documents to
a party the auditor ultimately represents, the general public, who is
also represented by-and an adversary via-the IRS. The government
did not make such an argument. Nonetheless, this line of reasoning
ignores the fact that accountants owe duties to more than the general
175 Id.
176 In reDiasonics Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4584-RFP, 1986 WL 53402, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
June 15, 1986) (unpublished decision).
177 Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 140 (quoting Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy,
Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
178 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
179 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
180 Id. at 238.
181 Merill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. at 448.
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public: they also owe duties to their clients. Indeed, the AICPA's Pro-
fessional Standards contain numerous references not only to responsi-
bilities to the public but to clients.182 Furthermore, while an audit
may serve the general public, the data used in an audit is not necessa-
rily public information; in fact, it is frequently confidential. And as
Deloitte observed, auditors have a responsibility to keep confidential
client information secret.183
This auditor responsibility provides the lynchpin in Deloitte's "rea-
sonable expectation of confidentiality" inquiry, where the court found
that while the two parties do not have common litigation interests,
"Deloitte, as an independent auditor, has an obligation to refrain
from disclosing confidential client information."18 4 This fact was mis-
takenly ignored in Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 185 which
found waiver because there was no "common interest" or "common
adversary," and therefore "privacy interests that the work-product doc-
trine was intended to protect" were not served and were therefore
waived.186 Prior to Deloitte, the D.C. Circuit said that waiver did not
occur as long as there was a reasonable maintenance of secrecy, or
expectation thereof.187 Deloitte did not change the standard, but
merely held that an auditor's professional obligations require him to
protect confidential information.
Many of the policy considerations enumerated for the work-prod-
uct analysis work equally as well for the waiver analysis, and a complete
critique need not be repeated here. A blanket rule may reduce the
182 See, e.g., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, Professional Standards § 53.01 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005) ("The accounting profession's public con-
sists of clients ... and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of certified
public accountants to maintain the orderly functioning of commerce. This reliance
imposes a public interest responsibility on certified public accountants. The public
interest is defined as the collective well-being of the community of people and institu-
tions the profession serves.").
183 United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, Professional Standards § 301.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 2005)).
184 Id. (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Professional Standards § 301.01
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005)). The government countered that
Rule 301 "shall not be construed . . . to affect in any way the member's obligation to
comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons." Id. However, as
the D.C. Circuit explained, "[A]n assertion of work-product protection challenges the
enforceability of a subpoena with respect to those materials." Id.
185 Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
186 Id. at 115-17.
187 See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
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quality of legal representation, disincentivize the writing of legal
advice, and harm the adversarial system.'8 But more importantly, a
blanket waiver rule "could very well discourage corporations from
conducting a critical self-analysis and sharing the fruits of such an
inquiry with the [auditors]."'89 In this regard, Deloitte got it right not
only on the law, but on the policy as well.
CONCLUSION
Because Deloitte affects the rules of evidence in the Tax Court,
provides much needed guidance on work-product waiver, and
redeems the work-product doctrine, its effects will reverberate long
into the future. It has been a winding road from Hickman to Deloitte,
with many bumps along the way, but Deloitte has brought the work-
product doctrine back to the path of well established case law, con-
gressional intent, and sound public policy.
To be sure, the work-product doctrine is still evolving: we are not
yet at the end of the road. Will other circuits follow Deloitte's roadmap
on waiver? We may not know for some time. Meanwhile, the
"because of' test may dominate the circuit split, but Textron still has
the force of law in the First Circuit, as does El Paso in the Fifth Circuit.
Companies with nationwide operations face considerable uncertainty
regarding the status of the work-product doctrine. But at least after
Deloitte they can breathe a sigh of relief: we are on the road again.
188 See supra Part IV.A.
189 Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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